1: Lattimore II-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

raise the question of Sinkiang seceding from the Chinese Republic." In addition to disavowing any intention of secession Akhmedjan stated that:

> The problem today is to confirm national unity and to put into effect a democratic policy. We do not put the question of the rule of one nation or group of nations over another nation or group of nations. Therefore the national self-government which we desire is supreme authority in our Province under an executive power which is to be effected not only by the Uighurs or those of Turkic race, but also by the unification of all the peoples in our Province and the implementation of a democratic policy.[17]

The demand of even the most militant Uighurs seems so far to have gone no further than the preservation of their own entity within the Chinese state. A key issue has been the struggle for elections free of intimidation by the Chinese, who attempted to cow the people with assertions that "We have the atom bomb," [18] and that "80,000 American troops" would come to establish "order" in Sinkiang.[19] Another demand has been for national courts adapted to the local needs of the population. The issue of the use of their own language also looms large in the eyes of the Uighurs. Item Three of the abortive Kulja Agreement provided that both Chinese and Uighur were to be used in all official documents, and that petitions from the people were to be in the language of the petitioner. Item Four provided that education in lower and middle schools was to be in the language of the student, that the study of Chinese was to be obligatory in middle schools, and that higher education was to be either in Chinese or in Uighur, according to the convenience of the student.

These items suggest the emphasis which Uighur nationalists, like those of other minority groups in Sinkiang, place on their cul-

[17] *Sin Çan Gezeti*, February 19, 1947 (in Uighur).
[18] *Loc. cit.* (in Uighur).
[19] *Sin Çan Gezeti*, Feb. 12 and 13, 1947 (in Uighur).

S
631 the 78 counties, 1 municipality, 1 central district in Sinkiang, at
668 least three times, and up to nine times... these conferences have been held. In Tihua Municipality and Ch'ien-tse County, the con-
S ference has already acted as the People's Congress. It elected
• [666] the mayor or the head of the county and the Council members..." (Burhan: "The great achievements during the three years of people's Sinkiang" in Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 1, 1953).

S. "In October, 1953, a general election was held..." (Burhan:
668 "The work report of the past six years of the Sinkiang Provincial
666 People's Government," a report at the 2nd meeting of the 1st session of the Provincial People's Congress, in Hsin-hua yüeh-pao, 1955, No. 11, p. 30).

N This general election mentioned by the Governor of Sinkiang,
#668 Burhan, was one part of the election held all over the country. It
666 was carried out according to the Electoral Law of 1953. The
S nation-wide election was not completed until September, 1954, just
668 in time to meet for voting on the new Constitution. The meetings
666 of the leading local People's Congresses in the Northwest were held on the following dates: (NCNA, August 24, 1954)

Unit	Beginning (1954)	End (1954)	Days of Meeting	Deputies Elected to the National People's Congress
Sian Municipality	July 14	July 17	4	8
Sinkiang Province	July 21	July 31	11	21
Chinghai Province	August 4	August 15	12	9
Shensi Province	August 4	August 12	8	19
Kansu Province	August 16	August 20	5	25

The real meaning of this kind of election was well illustrated in a deputy's confession: "I have never thought of being elected as a deputy to the National People's Congress. Some of my friends ran over the other day to congratulate me, saying, 'Do you know that? You have already received the weighty trust of the people of the whole nation. You are a deputy!'

"When I read my name in the People's Daily I did not know whether I was happy or flurried. My eyes became moist. I was grateful as well as ashamed. I felt that I could hardly catch my breath." (Ts'ao Yü, "I must do my job well as a deputy to the National People's Congress" in Hsin-kuan-ch'a, 1954, No. 18, September 16, p. 3).

VI. The Rights of the Minorities

C
668 A. Constitutional Rights
641 In the Common Program of 1949, chapter VI defined the Com-
642 munists' Nationality Policy. In this chapter, it said:
Article 50: All nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China are equal....

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*668 Even with the advent of the Chinese Communists, there was
554 little fundamental change in the composition of the panel of men
S in the political arena of the Northwest. The men who acquiesced
668 to the Communists and were retained in office as well as those who
554 opposed the Communists were the same men who had been in the
political limelight in the past. Some of the men sent out by the
Communist Central People's Government were the same men who
had been sent out in the past by the Nationalists. The names of
local Communist officials appeared to be new, but actually many
of them had been in the Northwest for a long time, working in the
underground. The old and the new, the local and the Peking-ap-
pointed, were all worked into the Administrative Council of the
S Northwest and the provincial governments. The general election
N of 1954 resulted in a reshuffle of the political figures of the North-
• [666] west, but not in a basic change in the composition.

N The situation in the northwestern provinces was in a state of
*668 flux in 1949 prior to the actual occupation by the Chinese Commun-
*175 ists who were then in the process of conquering all of mainland
669 China. In May, Sian was occupied by Chinese Communist troops,
S who were posed for their westward advance to gain control of Ning-
668 hsia, Chinghai (both of which soon fell to Communist arms), and
669 Sinkiang.
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S Out in the west, Sinkiang was divided into two political regimes:
669 the adherents of the provincial government and the insurrectionists
175 in Ili. At Urumchi was the headquarters of the Chinese Nationalist
631 Army, under the command of T'ao Chih-yüeh, and the provincial
635 government headed by Burkhan Shahidi, a Russianized Uighur, who
554 was then middle-of-the-road in politics and who represented the
large Uighur population. With him was Mehmet Emin Bughra, who
had played a part in the establishment of the East Turkestan Repub-
lic of 1933 (at Kashgar) as well as in the East Turkestan Republic
of 1944 (at Kulja in Ili). Politically, they cooperated with the
Nationalist Government and they sought only a modicum of liberties,
such as the establishment of a government of their own choosing
and the preservation of their languages, culture and traditions.
They were thus a less militantly revolutionary group than the Ili
faction. In September, 1949, with the defeat of the Nationalists on
the mainland, with the Chinese Communist Army preparing to
march into Sinkiang, and with the persuasion of such men as
Chang Chih-shung, the provincial government under Burkhan and
the Nationalist forces under T'ao Chih-yüeh formally submitted to
the Communists.

The revolutionary movement centered around Kulja was, since
1948, quiescent, rendered impotent by internal dissensions and
the defection of some of its leaders, including Osman Batur. To
recoup their fortunes, Akhmejan Kasimi and his lieutenant,
Saifuddin, organized the Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace

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*175 going to the polls, but in Chinghai where it was reported that 95
666 per cent of the people went to the polls, the election was only one-
*668 fourth completed.

In Sinkiang, the Communist authorities were more cautious.
S The experimental elections began in May, 1953, in 17 basic elec-
175 tion units (hsiang) selected from the ten administrative districts,
• 666 then in 36 basic election units. In these experimental elections,
668 80-95 per cent of the electorate turned out. With the successful conclusion of the experiments, the real basic level elections began in September in 665 basic level areas in Sinkiang, followed in December by the second group of 860 basic level area elections. By April, 1954, the basic level election in Sinkiang was concluded,
S having been held in 2,424 basic units in 83 counties and munici-
[369] palities. In urban areas, 89 per cent of the voters turned out, while in southern Sinkiang, the turnout by the Uighur population was 95 per cent. The elections during 1953 had been supervised by 1,127 cadres who formed 144 election courts and 98 mobile investigation teams, which uncovered 204 cases of irregularities and nonconformity.

The fruit of the efforts of the election cadres was the election of large numbers of cadres and party members. Sixty-three per cent of the 619 new party members employed in the Sinkiang provincial and Urumchi municipal governments were elected as delegates. In 312 hsiang in Sinkiang, out of the 7,088 of the delegates elected, 5,248 were Communist Party cadres, and the bulk were Chinese. In Ninghsia, only 25 per cent of the 9,700 deputies elected in the basic level elections were Chinese Moslems (Hui).

Moreover, the elections in the Northwest, as in the rest of
N China, were by no means universal. Vice-premier Teng Hsiao-
*175 p'ing, one of the top officials in charge of the nationwide elections,
666 revealed that basic level elections were not held in a quarter of
*668 the regions inhabited by national minorities, and the number of
641 national minority people who were not given a chance to vote came
*563 to 8,708,169. The reason for defranchising these minority people, he said, was due to the "lack of requisite conditions," which were (1) the native cadres were unsatisfactory and (2) the people failed to appreciate the nationality policy of the government. (NCNA June 19, 1954).

In contrast to the publicity given to the basic level elections
N in the Northwest, the elections in the higher levels were conducted
*175 quietly and, in many cases, the results were not published. How-
*668 ever, from scattered information gleaned from the Communist
666 press, the following picture emerges: in Shensi, Kansu, and
635 Sinkiang, the incumbent governors were re-elected. Only in
S Chinghai, was there a change in the governor. In these four pro-
[175] vinces, three of the governors are Chinese. In the three provinces
[666] of Shensi, Kansu and Chinghai, about half of the thirteen vice -
[668]
[635]

175 nationalities, will it be possible for Sinkiang nationalities to exer-
177 cise fully the rights of being masters of their own domain and
668 vigorously develop the political and cultural activities in the
642 Autonomous Region." (NCNA September 24, 1955).
563 On October 1, 1955, the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region officially came into being. The last act of the Sinkiang People's
[666] Congress was the election of the 37-man people's council of the new Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (the names of the members have not yet been published). Saifuddin, the vice-chairman of the erstwhile provincial council, was elected chairman of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, but at the end of the month he resigned and Burkhan, the former chairman was reelected chairman. The vice-chairmen included Kao Chin-shun, former vice-chairman, and two natives, a Uighur and a Kazakh.

The Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, formerly subordinated to the Northwest Bureau, was made independent and renamed the Sinkiang Committee, but the party officials remained unchanged. The first secretary was Wang En-mao, a native of Kiangsi who spoke none of the local languages, the second secretary was Kao Chin-shun, concurrently vice-chairman of the autonomous region, the third secretary was Chang Pang-ying. Only the fourth secretary, Saifuddin, was a native. These men had held their positions since 1949. Both the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Sinkiang party committee thus came directly under the control of Peking.

VIII. Prospects

175 The formation of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region
177 brings to a close an important phase in the political domination of
668 the Northwest by the Chinese Communists. By 1955, under the intensive program of party expansion and the staffing of the governments by party men and by tried and tested cadres, the provinces of Shensi, Kansu and Chinghai were already under effective Communist control. The United Front of the period of "New Democracy" came to an end with the transition of the country to socialism. The non-Communists in the government were cowed and eliminated. Those who survived the purges of 1952 were weeded out in the
[642] elections of 1953-54. The granting of autonomy to the Uighurs and other minority peoples in Chinese Turkestan was to placate their discontent and to satisfy their yearning for self-rule, but it was rigged in such a manner as to make the domination of the Chinese Communists over Sinkiang and its ties with China Proper firmer and stronger than that accomplished by any governments in the past.

However, the efforts of the Chinese Communists to consolidate and centralize their control over the Northwest provinces are still impeded, internally, by the clash of interests within the ranks